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We estimate a conditional logit model to measure the impact of airport and airline supply 
characteristics on the air travel choices of passengers departing from one of three San 
Francisco Bay area airports and arriving at one of four airports in greater Los Angeles in 
October  1995.  Non-price  characteristics like airport access time, airport delay, flight 
frequency, the availability of particular airport-airline combinations, and early arrival times 
are found to strongly affect choice probabilities.    Marginal effects and counterfactual 
scenarios suggest that changes access in times affect travel choices more than changes in 
travel delays, and that the preferred airport differs by passenger  type.  In  order  to  examine 
the robustness of the conditional logit model, we estimate a mixed logit model, and find 
that the results are similar.    We attribute the similarity to our strictly defined travel market 
and to our distinction between leisure and business travelers, thus controlling for two 
important sources of consumer heterogeneity. 
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1. Introduction 
Many studies of competition in the airline industry define markets for air travel in 
terms of airport pairs.    While justified in markets where both the trip origin and the 
destination are served by a single airport, this approach is less suitable for markets 
characterized by a high density of demand, where travelers often have a choice of airport at 
both the travel origin and destination.    Large metropolitan areas (for example Boston, 
Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, the San Francisco Bay Area, Washington D.C.) typically 
are served by several nearby airports that provide flights to a similar set of destinations.   
The airports may be fairly close substitutes to travelers, and it is desirable to take this into 
account when analyzing competition in this type of market.    This paper investigates how 
the characteristics of the choices for traveling from the Bay Area to greater L.A. in October 
1995 affect the probability that travelers’ choose a particular option.    In particular, our data 
allow us to focus on non-price characteristics, such as departure and arrival airport 
characteristics, airline, flight frequency, travel delay, and arrival early in the day.    The non-
price characteristics are found to be important co-determinants of travel choices.    Fares 
negatively affect demand for leisure travel, but not so much for business travel.   
In the type of multi-airport market that is considered here, the vertical and 
horizontal interactions between airlines and airports are more complex than in a single 
airport context, as airlines need to make choices concerning pricing and service 
characteristics for different, substitutable airports, and airport behavior is affected by the 
presence of nearby airports.
 1    This paper stops well short of providing an integrated 
model of supply and demand in multi-airport markets, but it sheds light on how the 
structure of demand shapes competition in such  a  setting.  The  analysis is relevant to a 
range of issues in the air transportation industry.    Consider, for example, the ongoing trend 
towards increased airport independence, which is anticipated to benefit travelers through 
more intense competition (FAA/OST, 1999).    These anticipated benefits are conditional on 
the substitutability of airports, which in turn depends on price and non-price characteristics 
of airport services.    As a second example, airlines may exploit the availability of different 
                                                 
1  Airports may be effectively controlled by an airline, and they may maximize profit, surplus, or output.    In 
each of these cases, spatial market power is limited by the presence of substitute airports, and this affects 
choices regarding capacity, access charges, and the pricing of passenger services (Van Dender, 2006).   2
airports to engage in product differentiation and price discrimination, by offering different 
levels of service quality at different airports.    As noted in Borenstein (1989), price 
discrimination can be used by airlines to segment the market, separating passengers who 
might switch among airports from those strongly entrenched in their airport choice.         
The empirical analysis is based on a combination of datasets, among which the 
1995 airline passenger survey in the San Francisco Bay Area.    We estimate weighted 
conditional logit models as well a mixed logit model, both of which produce similar results.   
The main findings are that passengers traveling from the Bay Area to greater L.A. consider 
the departure airports (OAK, SFO, SJO)
2  to be fairly close substitutes, with SFO preferred 
when everything else is equal.    More detailed interpretations are made on the basis of 
calculated marginal effects and counterfactual scenarios.    Our findings concerning the 
determinants of airport choice are that the various components of time costs associated with 
an airport are important.    Both business travelers and leisure travelers care more about 
access times than about delays, but business travelers care relatively more about delays. 
Airline choice also depends on the quality of service (frequency of service and delays) and 
on fares, and early morning flights are prefered over later  ones.  Airport  and  airline 
dummy variables are important, pointing to residual heterogeneity that is not captured by 
the included airline and airport characteristics.    One set of counterfactual scenarios shows 
that reducing relative time costs is an effective way of increasing market share of an airport 
and of airlines that dominate it (United Airlines in the case of SFO).  A  further  set  of 
counterfactual scenarios assumes that Southwest Airlines enters at SFO, where it was not 
actually present in October 1995.    We find that Southwest increases its market share by 
doing so, except among leisure travelers under the further assumption that Southwest 
abandons its operation at OAK.    This suggests that some leisure travelers have a strong 
preference for Southwest in OAK.
3       
The paper is structured as follows.    Section 2 provides a review of related 
literature, and a description of our contributions to it.    Section 3 describes the data and the 
results of the weighted conditional logit and mixed logit models; we present coefficient 
                                                 
2  OAK is Oakland International airport, SFO is San Francisco International, and SJO is San Jose International. 
3  The counterfactuals abstract from cost effects and capacity constraints, and maintain the assumption that 
non-United rivals do not respond to Southwest’s actions.   3
estimates and marginal effects.    Section 4 discusses counterfactual scenarios that illustrate 
the joint impact of the estimated model. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.       
 
2. Literature 
Our empirical analysis is related to a relatively small literature on airport choice in a 
multi-airport region, where the choice for an airport may be modeled as such, or in 
combination with transport mode choices for ground access or with airline choices.
 4  The 
models are estimated using discrete choice techniques of varying complexity and 
generality, but there is wide consensus that ground access times and quality of service 
(often measured by flight frequencies) strongly affect the choice for a particular airport.  
We review some contributions that, like us, use the 1995 air passenger survey for the Bay 
Area airports as the central source of data on travel choices.   
Pels et al. (2001) analyze the choice for an airport and an airline in the San 
Francisco Bay Area using a nested logit model, and find that a model where the airport is 
chosen first and the airline next is statistically preferred over the reverse choice structure.  
Using the same dataset and a nested logit model to look at the choice of access mode and 
airport, Pels et al. (2003) find that the mode choice patterns imply high values of time.  
Basar and Bhat (2002, 2004) estimate a probabilistic choice set multinomial logit model of 
airport choice by business travelers residing in the Bay Area.  Their model allows the 
choice set to be constructed by travelers, in particular allowing for the possibility that 
travelers do not take all departure airports into account. They find that access time matters, 
more so than frequency, but that the effect of access time is weaker and that of flight 
frequency is stronger than in a standard multinomial logit model, where the choice set is 
exogenously given.  Most recently, Hess and Polak (2004) analyze airport choice in the 
San Francisco Bay Area using a mixed multinomial logit specification, so allowing for 
random preference variation, and find that this affects the results.  One suggested 
explanation as to why a mixed logit model performs better than the standard logit model, is 
that not all variation in the sensitivity of airport choice to access time is captured by 
observed passenger characteristics.    
                                                 
4  The early contributions are by Skinner (1976), Harvey (1987) and Ashford and Bencheman (1987).   4
  Our analysis starts by defining a specific market for air travel, and this leads to 
three main differences with the reviewed work.  First, we restrict attention to a specific set 
of destinations (four airports in or around Los Angeles), rather than lumping all 
destinations together as is done in the mentioned studies.  In doing so, we delineate a 
specific market in which carriers compete directly.  The particular market is served by 
direct flights, so that aspects of network competition (other than hub dominance, which we 
take to be exogenous to the market under study) are relatively unimportant.  Also, 
unobserved variation in egress times from destination airports is lower when arrival airports 
are controlled for.  Second, we consider a more detailed representation of flight 
characteristics and flight choice than earlier studies.  For example, we consider differences 
between business and leisure travel, between peak and offpeak travel, and between early 
and late flights.  We use information on fares and on delays at arrival and at destination 
airports, and we allow for airline specific effects.  Finally, we correct for choice based 
sampling, more particularly for over-sampling of passengers departing from San Jose 
airport, in order to obtain an estimated model that is suitable for marginal effects 
calculation and counterfactual simulation.     
While our analysis focuses on airport and airline choice, we think of it as being 
informative to analyses of competition in the air transportation industry.  While much of 
the literature on the topic focuses on airline competition, some studies recognize the 
importance of airport characteristics.  In particular, researchers have focused on the impact 
of “airport dominance” and airport congestion on airline competition.  Key papers on the 
role of airport dominance in airline competition include Borenstein (1989, 1991), Berry 
(1990, 1992), Morrison and Winston (1989), Evans and Kessides (1993), and Berry, 
Carnall and Spiller (1997).
5  A central idea here is that larger airport presence increases the 
value to consumers of frequent flier programs and other airline marketing programs, and 
this enables airlines to charge higher fares.  However, the ability of airlines to use airport 
dominance to extract consumer surplus will depend on the presence of substitute airports: 
in markets served by multiple airports, the dominance of any one airport by an airline does 
                                                 
5 Of particular relevance is the Morrison and Winston (1989) study which uses an empirical strategy similar 
to ours.  They estimate the impact of airport presence on airline choice by applying a multinomial logit 
model to DB1A passenger data.   Our study can be considered an extension of theirs – expanding the choice 
set to include airport choice.    Our data also provide more information about the passengers than DB1A.   5
not necessarily preclude other airlines from offering a similar array of flights.  This type of 
effect is discussed in Morrison (2001), who finds that the presence of Southwest at nearby 
airports disciplines carriers at any particular airport, but  the effect is weaker compared to 
the case where Southwest competes in the same airport.  Borenstein (2005, table 2) 
provides suggestive evidence that airport competition may reduce the impact of airport 
dominance on airfare, in that hub airports in metropolitan areas served by multiple airports 
(e.g. San Francisco Bay Area, Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, D.C.) seem to be 
associated with lower hub premiums than hub airports in single airport markets (e.g. 
Charlotte, Cincinnati, Detroit, Memphis Minneapolis).
6 
A different strand of the air transportation literature studies service quality 
competition, with an emphasis on on-time performance, and starting from the basic 
observation that flights into or out of certain airports are prone to travel delay more than 
others.  Apart from natural causes (e.g. fog at San Francisco), airport congestion can 
contribute to travel delay, with hub airports particularly congested as airlines seek to 
maximize economics of traffic density (scope).  This is demonstrated in Brueckner and 
Spiller (1994) and Mayer and Sinai (2003).  Mazzeo (2003) finds that on-time 
performance is worse (delays are more common and longer) on concentrated routes, 
suggesting that airlines may use airport dominance to extract surplus not only through 
higher airfares but also through cost savings associated with the offering of lower quality 
service.  Here too, however, the availability of substitute airports may provide an incentive 
for dominating airlines to offer higher quality service.  In this context, Januszewski (2004) 
estimates the value that passengers attach to on-time performance.  Using an exogenous 
shock to the on-time arrival of flights to LaGuardia, she finds that longer delays imply 
lower prices, and that the size of the effect depends on the availability of substitutes: when 
                                                 
6 Airport choice has implications for the empirical literature on airline entry, where increased attention has 
been brought to the issue of low-cost carriers, most notably Southwest, entering the markets of incumbent, 
hub-and-spoke carriers.  Recent research includes Ito and Lee (2004) and Goolsbee and Syverson (2005). If 
city airports are imperfect substitutes, they are a form of product differentiation for the airline.  Given that 
low cost carriers often enter the adjacent, non-hub airport in major metropolitan areas, current studies may 
underestimate the change in market share and incumbent response effected by the entry of a low cost carrier 
at the hub airport.  One of our counterfactual exercises addresses these issues.   6
substitute flights are available at the same or at competing airports, changes in service 
quality have larger effects on prices.
7  Flights at the same airport are closer substitutes, and 
therefore have a larger effect.  In addition, the effects are larger for business travelers, 
presumably because they strongly dislike schedule delays.   
 
3.  Estimating an airport and airline choice model for air travel from the San 
Francisco Bay Area to greater Los Angeles in 1995 
 
3.1  Data and basic specification 
Our data describe the choice set, the actual choices, and the main time and money 
costs associated with the choice alternatives, for passengers traveling by air from the San 
Francisco Bay Area to greater Los Angeles during two weeks of October 1995.   
Specifically, we observe the choice of departure airport, arrival airport, carrier, peak or 
offpeak departure, and early or late flight.
8    The time cost components include the driving 
time from the initial origin to the airport, the expected flight delays at the departure airport 
and at the arrival airport, and the schedule delay cost as approximated by the frequency of 
flights per airline per airport.
9  The money cost is an approximation of the flight fare.   
Because of data limitations, fares are measured at a much more aggregated level than other 
flight characteristics, and may be different from actual transaction prices.    Our use of fare 
information is largely restricted to comparing average differences across flight choices; 
precise estimation of trade-offs between time and money (i.e. estimating values of time) is 
not possible.    Lastly, we have information on a set of socio-demographic variables, 
including whether passengers travel for business or leisure purposes, the exact location of 
departure in the Bay Area, whether travelers are residents of or visitors to the Bay Area, and 
                                                 
7  The overall effect is estimated at $1.16 per minute of delay, increasing to $1.55 when there is competition. 
8  Peak hours are from 6-9 am and 3 - 6 pm; all other hours offpeak.    Early flights at an L.A. airport are those 
arriving within a time interval defined by the earliest arriving flight at that airport, plus 30 minutes.    Late 
flights are those arriving at an airport in a time interval defined by the latest arriving flight, minus 30 minutes. 
9  We do not include flight times.    Since all passengers fly to greater LA, the variation in flight times can be 
expected to be minimal.    Similarly, we do not include airport egress times and travel times to the final 
destination, but the variation is likely to be relatively small as we focus on a single market and control for the 
arrival airport.   7
the travelers’ income group.     
    The dataset is composed from various sources, the primary of which is the 
Airline Passenger Survey as conducted in August and October 1995 by the Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission (MTC) in collaboration with SFO, SJC, OAK, and Sonoma 
County Airport (STS).
10    The survey contains a purposely large number of interviews 
conducted at SJC, but passengers were randomly interviewed at each airport.    We correct 
for choice based sampling at the level of the airport in the estimation.    After omitting 
observations because no fare is reported for the flight or no match could be made with the 
flight schedule data, because non-car access, or because no income was reported, 1,752 
observations remain, of which 935 are business travelers and 817 are leisure travelers.   
The airline passenger survey is combined with several secondary sources.  First,  the  1998 
car travel times from a passenger’s initial origin in the Bay Area to the airports are derived 
from the MTC’s transportation network model.
11    Second, the summary of the Origin and 
Destination Survey (DB1A) as provided by Severin Borenstein provides aggregate fare data, 
as well as weights that correct for choice based sampling.
12  Third,  Airline  Online 
Performance Data from the Bureau of Transport Statistics provide information on delays at 
the level of the origin and destination airports.
13  Fourth,  the  Worldwide  Through  Flight 
Schedules Database obtained from OAG is used to construct passengers’ choice sets.    We 
assume that the complete set of flights was actually available to passengers at the time they 
purchased a ticket.   
                                                 
10  http://www.mtc.dst.ca.us/datamart/airpass1.htm. A first wave of the survey took place in August 1995 and a 
second one in October 1995.    The August survey reports zero passengers departing from OAK using United 
Airlines (UA), which contrasts with other sources (OAG and T-100) that indicate a substantial presence of UA 
at OAK in August of 1995.    Since our analysis considers airport and airline choice, it seemed appropriate to 
exclude the August data. 
11  ftp://ftp.abag.ca.gov/pub/mtc/planning/forecast/RVAL98/  
12  The weights obtained from DB1A were validated against T-100 data.    T-100 is an alias for the 'Air Carrier 
Statistics Databank', based on 'Form 41 Traffic' collected by the BTS.    T-100 data are segment based, but 
since the travel market considered here is served by direct flights, the market shares of DB1A and T-100 
should be similar. 
13  http://www.transtats.bts.gov.  
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We first estimate a weighted conditional logit model (Manski and Lerman, 1977) 
defined over travel choices that are a combination of departure airport, arrival airport, 
airline, and peak or off-peak travel.    The choices are conditional on the passengers 
accessing the airport of choice by car and flying to greater Los Angeles.    An example of a 
particular choice alternative is a flight from SFO to LAX with UA during peak hours; a 
different option would be a flight from OAK to SNA with WN (Southwest) during the 
offpeak.    For our basic specification, a passenger’s choice is modeled as the maximization 
of the indirect utility function (1). Let the following sets denote departure airports, arrival 
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The specification is estimated in a conditional logit model for all. for business and 
for leisure travelers.    The distinction between passenger types is relevant, so we treat the 
separate estimates as the preferred ones, and omit the results for “all passengers” for the 
sake of brevity.    Using the same data, we estimate a mixed logit model for business and 
leisure travelers, assuming normal mixing distributions over dummy variables for departure 
airports and airlines, and over the fare and time cost variables.    The mixed logit model 
relaxes the strict substitution patterns imposed by the conditional logit model (Train, 2003) , 
so its results inform us on the impact of those restrictions.   9
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
sjc sjc=1 if departure airport is SJC 0.576 0.494 0 1
oak oak=1 if departure airport is OAK 0.284 0.451 0 1
wn wn=1 if airline is WN (southwest airlines) 0.691 0.462 0 1
ua ua=1 if airline is UA (united airlines) 0.164 0.370 0 1
bur bur=1 if arrival airport is BUR 0.212 0.409 0 1
ont ont=1 if arrival airport is ONT 0.151 0.358 0 1
sna sna=1 if arrival airport is SNA 0.226 0.418 0 1
fare Average Coach Airfare ($ in 1995) 59.009 12.359 50 182
freq Average number of flights per hour 1.032 0.801 0.167 4
accetime Access time (minutes) 24.142 20.008 1.7 125.1
tdelay Sum of average departure delay and arrival delay 10.374 6.529 1.664 28.275
incgroup2 Fare * income group2 ($75,000-$149,000) 46.803 26.449 0 182
incgroup3 Fare * income group3 ($150,000 or more) 9.867 22.794 0 108
earBUR Early arrival at Burbank 0.029 0.168 0 1
earLAX Early arrival at Los Angeles 0.074 0.262 0 1
earONT Early arrival at Ontario 0.039 0.193 0 1
earSNA Early arrival at Santa Anna 0.029 0.168 0 1
latBUR Late arrival at Burbank 0.006 0.080 0 1
latLAX Late arrival at Los Angeles 0.160 0.367 0 1
latONT Late arrival at Ontario 0.042 0.200 0 1
latSNA Late arrival at Santa Anna 0.021 0.145 0 1
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
sjc sjc=1 if departure airport is SJC 0.355 0.479 0 1
oak oak=1 if departure airport is OAK 0.512 0.500 0 1
wn wn=1 if airline is WN (southwest airlines) 0.703 0.457 0 1
ua ua=1 if airline is UA (united airlines) 0.179 0.383 0 1
bur bur=1 if arrival airport is BUR 0.190 0.392 0 1
ont ont=1 if arrival airport is ONT 0.162 0.368 0 1
sna sna=1 if arrival airport is SNA 0.138 0.345 0 1
fare Average Coach Airfare ($ in 1995) 56.266 8.997 50 108
freq Average number of flights per hour 0.626 0.410 0.083 2
accetime Access time (minutes) 29.887 23.365 2.6 173.9
tdelay Sum of average departure delay and arrival delay 12.508 6.851 1.664 28.275
incgroup2 Fare * income group2 ($75,000-$149,000) 32.988 28.923 0 108
incgroup3 Fare * income group3 ($150,000 or more) 6.407 18.440 0 76.4
earBUR Early arrival at Burbank 0.026 0.158 0 1
earLAX Early arrival at Los Angeles 0.104 0.305 0 1
earONT Early arrival at Ontario 0.047 0.211 0 1
earSNA Early arrival at Santa Anna 0.022 0.147 0 1
latBUR Late arrival at Burbank 0.012 0.110 0 1
latLAX Late arrival at Los Angeles 0.193 0.395 0 1
latONT Late arrival at Ontario 0.042 0.200 0 1
latSNA Late arrival at Santa Anna 0.005 0.070 0 1
Table 1a     Summary statistics for business passengers (935 observations)
Table 1b      Summary statistics for leisure passengers (817 observations)
 
   10
Table 1 provides definitions and summary statistics for the explanatory variables, 
separately for business and leisure travelers.    Airport choice is explained by dummy 
variables for departure and for arrival airport, as we expect that the other explanatory 
variables do not capture all relevant airport characteristics.    The dummies for United 
Airlines (UA) and Southwest Airlines (WN) are introduced because fare variation between 
carriers does not capture all, or even the most important, reasons why these carriers are 
chosen; other relevant characteristics include consumer loyalty programs and airport 
dominance (at the time of study, UA dominated SFO, and WN dominated OAK).    We also 
include dummy variables to indicate the earliest and latest arriving flights at the four L.A. 
region airports.
14    Passengers flying from the Bay Area to L.A. may prefer early flights as 
this maximizes the length of stay of short duration  trips.  Evening  flights may be disliked 
because no later same day flights may be available in case the flight is missed.     
The continuous explanatory variables are flight frequency, ground access time to 
the airport, airport delays, and the fare as well as the interaction between fare and 
passengers’ income group.    Flight frequency is measured at the airport – airline – period 
level, and indicates quality of service.    Ground access times are defined at the airport – 
period level, and are part of the overall cost of using a particular airport.    Airport delays 
are measured at the airport level, and co-determine service quality.    Fares are part of the 
cost of flying, and we allow the fare effect to depend on income levels. 
Controlling for a fairly large set of demand characteristics helps limit the problem 
of endogeneity of fares and travel delay, stemming from omitted factors. However, there 
are other complications associated with fares.    First, the airfare used to evaluate the 
indirect utility associated with a flight option is not the actual transaction airfare faced by 
the surveyed passenger, but rather the average transaction airfare for that flight during the 
studied period.    Second, we do not observe when the passenger purchased her ticket.   
The choice set is based on what we observe ex post and not necessarily what was available 
to the passenger at the time of the booking.    We partially address this complication by 
estimating a separate model for leisure and business travelers, as the choice set is more 
likely to be common among travelers of similar trip type, with leisure travelers more likely 
                                                 
14  Early and late arrival times are airport-specific.    For example, the earliest arrival 7.30am at SNA, 6.00am 
at BUR, and 6.30am at LAX.   11
to buy their tickets in advance and business on short notice.    Nevertheless, the 
complications suggest that the strength of the empirical model is in analyzing the role of 
non-price airport and airline characteristics in air travel choice, controlling for general fare 
differences, rather than the estimation of particular own and cross price elasticities or 
values of time. 
Table 2 reports estimation results for the basic specification, separately for business 
and leisure travelers; Table 2a provides coefficient estimates and standard errors; Table 2b 
shows marginal effects, which can be compared across subgroups.
15,16    With the exception 
of some fare related coefficients and a few dummy variables, the coefficients are estimated 
with good precision, and the signs of the effects correspond to intuition.  Alternatives  with 
lower prices, lower access costs, shorter delays and higher flight frequencies are more 
likely to be chosen than others.    The effect of fares on business travel decisions is not 
found to differ from zero.    This may reflect our use of average rather than actual fares, but 
it also is plausible that business travelers do not strongly respond to fare differences in 
deciding how to travel. The airport dummies are precisely estimated and significant. SFO is 
the preferred departure airport and LAX is the preferred destination airport, ceteris paribus. 
Passengers are also more likely to choose an airport that is served by Southwest Airlines or 
by United Airlines, although the latter effect is not precisely estimated for leisure travelers.   
Note that this preference is over and above Southwest’s low fares and United Airlines’ high 
frequency of services from SFO to LAX.
17    The results seem consistent with the 
                                                 
15  The results are for the weighted conditional logit model.    Coefficient estimates for the unweighted model 
can be found in the appendix.    As suggested by Manski and Lerman (1977), the coefficient estimates 
between the two models differ mainly in the choice specific intercepts.    However, since the marginal effects 
are a function of all of the coefficients including the airline and airport dummies, they differ substantially for 
all of the included airline and airport characteristics as well.    For many marginal effects, ignoring the choice 
based sampling leads to values that are roughly half of those obtained from a weighted model.   
16  The marginal effects are “own characteristic marginal effects”, i.e. the partial derivatives of the probability 
of the actual choice with respect to a change in that choice’s characteristic, taking account of the presence of 
any interaction terms.    For dummy variables, the marginal effects are defined as probability differences.   
Appendix 2 provides more details. 
17  The October 1995 survey reports a 75% market share of UA at SFO (USair: 15%, Delta: 7%).    UA has a 
market share of 18% at OAK and is not present at SJC.    Southwest dominates both OAK (75%) and SJC   12
“Southwest effect” and “hub-dominance effect”, as identified in earlier empirical analyses 
of the airline industry.    The “early flight” dummies for LAX are positive and precisely 
estimated for both types of traveler, indicating that passengers value arriving in LAX in the 
early morning.    This result was expected because the length of stay for travel to LAX and 
originating in the Bay Area is often short, e.g. one or two days.    In that case, arriving early 
allows travelers to spend a full day at their destination, even on the day of departure.    The 
effect is imprecisely estimated for BUR.    The estimate for SNA is precise, but smaller 
than for LAX and ONT, which may reflects flight time restrictions at SNA, because of 
which the early flights to SNA arrive later in the day than at other airports.    Late flights 
are valued negatively, but the effects are not precisely estimated.    So there is only weak 
evidence that passengers avoid late flights in order to minimize the risk of having to wait 
until the next day.
18 
Table 2b shows marginal effects, which can be compared between business and 
leisure travelers. The results for both are largely similar, but there are some noticeable 
differences as well.    For example, the preferred airports differ substantially.    The 
marginal effect on the probability that a flight departing from SJC is chosen rather than one 
from SFO, after controlling for observable airport characteristics, is negative but much 
stronger for leisure travelers than for business travelers.    The reverse relation holds for the 
marginal effect on the choice probabilities of choosing a flight from OAK rather than SFO.   
The results suggest that SFO and OAK are close substitutes, in particular for leisure 
travelers.    SJC is a relatively close substitute for SFO for business travelers, but less so for 
leisure travelers. 
                                                                                                                                                     
(85%).    It is not present at SFO.    In terms of arrival airports, Southwest dominates BUR (82%), ONT (94%) 
and SNA (56%).    UA carries 18% of passengers at BUR, 23% at LAX, 6% at ONT and 11% at SNA.     
18  Anecdotical evidence suggests that the last daily flight is rarely cancelled.    The risk of not getting to L.A. 
then is not related to potential cancellations, but to decisions under the passengers’ control, in which case a 
weak effect is to be expected because passengers can take precautions to not miss the flight.   13
Table 2a   WESML estimation results for conditional logit model, October 1995     
Coeff. std. error Coeff. std. error
SJC dummy -0.6514 0.2973 -1.0901 0.3050
OAK dummy -0.6900 0.2176 -0.4176 0.2007
WN dummy 1.0990 0.1712 1.0694 0.2124
UA dummy 0.5043 0.1985 0.2406 0.1889
BUR dummy -0.1827 0.1725 -0.4590 0.1764
ONT dummy -0.4092 0.2051 -0.8486 0.2185
SNA dummy -0.3936 0.1996 -0.9105 0.2581
fare -0.0077 0.0089 -0.0259 0.0102
freq_hour 0.4168 0.1071 0.6322 0.2127
accetime -0.0815 0.0043 -0.0774 0.0044
tdelay -0.0498 0.0155 -0.0257 0.0158
incgroup2 0.0040 0.0080 0.0208 0.0093
incgroup3 0.0029 0.0077 0.0088 0.0111
earBUR 0.2614 0.2816 -0.0726 0.3099
earLAX 0.6163 0.2624 0.5644 0.2417
earONT 0.7024 0.2824 0.7705 0.2661
earSNA 0.3166 0.2879 0.3267 0.3636
latBUR -0.3181 0.3099 -0.0196 0.2596
latLAX -0.2420 0.2098 -0.3260 0.2083
latONT -0.5641 0.2622 0.1165 0.2706





-2,677.19 -2,555.43  
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Table 3    Weighted Mixed logit estimation results: Weekday travel, October 1995 – UPDATE     
coeff. std.error coeff. std.error
SJC mean -0.7091 0.2624 -1.5993 0.2958
SJC std 0.0022 0.0092 0.0191 0.0404
OAK mean -0.6637 0.2025 -0.4334 0.1818
OAK std 0.0080 0.0093 0.0117 0.0391
WN mean 1.1066 0.2198 1.2861 0.3566
WN std 0.0291 0.0255 1.0544 1.0392
UA mean 0.5223 0.1990 0.0432 0.3631
UA std 0.0116 0.0234 1.4641 1.2924
fare mean -0.0094 0.0141 -0.0214 0.0142
fare std 0.0084 0.0145 0.0000 0.0027
freq mean 0.4205 0.1301 0.7191 0.2232
freq std 0.0228 0.0400 0.0429 0.0774
Accetime mean -0.1023 0.0096 -0.1314 0.0179
Accetime std 0.0451 0.0101 0.0820 0.0150
BUR -0.2262 0.1649 -0.5614 0.1696
ONT -0.4742 0.2046 -0.9874 0.2123
SNA -0.4350 0.2135 -1.1700 0.2561
tdelay -0.0539 0.0150 -0.0484 0.0167
Inc2 0.0044 0.0085 0.0203 0.0133
Inc3 0.0030 0.0075 0.0050 0.0100
earBUR 0.3559 0.2479 0.1384 0.2884
earLAX 0.6640 0.2424 0.6705 0.2335
earONT 0.8050 0.2700 1.0836 0.2774
earSNA 0.3996 0.2284 0.6253 0.3204
latBUR -0.3295 0.5255 -0.1009 0.4708
latLAX -0.2868 0.1964 -0.3883 0.1848
latONT -0.5820 0.3271 0.0172 0.3385
latSNA 0.6820 0.4576 -0.3265 0.6168
LogL




Distribution assumption Variable Business Leisure
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A puzzling result is the finding that leisure travelers seem to care more about flight 
frequency than business travelers.    Lastly, while business travelers value time spent 
accessing the airport and on flight delays roughly the same, leisure travelers seem to care 
more about access time.    This may be due to the fact that opportunity cost of time for 
business travelers is foregone work time, while for leisure travelers the disutility of 
spending time in traffic vs. waiting at the airport is more important.    Other possible 
explanations include differences in risk aversion, with higher access time indicating greater 
chance of missing flights, differences in information set, with business travelers better 
perceiving both access time and travel delay, and the greater hassle of dealing with children 
in cars than at the airport.   
        Table 3 presents the corresponding estimates from a weighted “mixed logit” 
model where we allow some coefficients to vary randomly according to a normal 
distribution, so allowing for unobserved variation in preferences.
19  We mix the three 
departure airport dummies, the two airline dummies, and the two “value of time” 
characteristics of access time and travel delay.    Estimation difficulties prevent us from 
estimating a more generally mixed model.    With the exception of the airline dummies for 
leisure travelers, the weighted mixed logit yields results are similar to those from the 
weighted conditional logit.    The random coefficients are largely centered at the conditional 
logit estimates with small estimated standard deviations. This result contrasts those reported 
in other airport choice studies (in particular Hess and Polak, 2005) and suggests that our 
focus on a single market and trip type accounts for much of the consumer preference 
heterogeneity in the sample.
20  The large variation in preference for airlines by leisure 
travelers probably reflects the adoption of different frequent flyer programs.
21 However, 
the large standard deviations are estimated imprecisely.  We  find  little evidence suggesting 
that a mixed logit model substantially outperforms the conditional logit model after 
controlling for market and trip type.    On the basis of this judgment, we calculate the 
                                                 
19  See Train (2003) for more details on the Mixed Logit model. The asymptotic properties of the weighted 
mixed logit models are based on results in Wooldridge (2001) 
20  We found the mixed logit results to be robust to different initial values. 
21  Analogously, the small standard deviation for the mixing distribution for airlines for business travelers 
suggests most business travelers have similar frequent flyer participation.   16
counterfactual scenarios using the weighted conditional logit estimates. 
 
4. Counterfactual  scenarios 
This section reports on three counterfactual scenarios that were calculated using the 
conditional logit model presented in the previous section.    The purpose is to provide 
further insight into the role of airport characteristics and airline behavior on the market 
under consideration, taking account of the model as a whole rather than its separate 
coefficients.    The first two scenarios highlight the importance of time costs in airport and 
airline choice.    In the first scenario (Access SFO) ground access times to SFO are reduced 
by 5 minutes.    In the second scenario (Delay SFO) delays for flights from SFO are 
reduced by 5 minutes.    The third scenario (Southwest SFO) has more of an IO flavor, as it 
considers the effect of entry by Southwest Airlines into SFO.    Since we have no explicit 
model of supply, four polar cases of the scenario are calculated: in version A (duplicate, 
accomodate) Southwest duplicates its 1995 operation at OAK in SFO and there is no price 
response from UA (its main competitor); in version B (transfer, accommodate) Southwest 
transfers its entire OAK operation to SFO, and UA sticks to its prices.    In version C 
(duplicate, match) Southwest duplicates in SFO and there is UA responds by adopting 
Soutwest’s prices; in version D (transfer, match) Southwest transfers its operation from 
OAK to SFO, and UA adopts the Southwest prices.    In all versions, Southwest charges the 
same prices at SFO than it in fact charged at OAK, and airlines other than United Airlines 
do not change their prices and service levels.
22 
Table 4 compares the results from the counterfactual scenario to the predicted 
values of the estimated model (baseline) rather than to the observed values.    We report 
market shares for business, leisure, and all passengers.    The random error term is assumed 
to be the same, at the level of an observation, in the baseline and in the counterfactual 
scenario.    The scenarios take the decision to travel by air as given, so they only consider 
substitution between travel alternatives in response to a change in travel options or travel 
costs, abstracting from substitution effects with an outside good.    This may be a 
reasonable assumption for business travelers, whose demand for air travel is fairly 
                                                 
22  Ito and Lee (2004) find incumbent response to low cost carrier entry to be fairly accommodating.   17
inelastic.
23  
Table 4  Key results for counterfactual scenarios: percentage market shares * 








       Duplicate  Transfer  Duplicate  Transfer 
       A  B  C  D 
Leisure only              
% from SFO  27.1  33.5  29.1  46.5  66.2  62.4  78.6 
% from SJC  20.0  18.4  19.5  15.4  19.1  11.3  13.0 
% from OAK  53.0  48.1  51.4  38.1  14.7  26.3  8.4 
              
% with UA  29.5  33.5  30.8 18.6 29.6 46.0  59.3 
% with WN  57.8  52.7  56.2  73.0  58.8  48.4  33.8 
% with other  12.7  13.8  13.0  8.4  11.6  5.6  6.9 
              
Business 
only 
            
% from SFO  31.4  37.7  35.2  45.0  56.6  49.1  60.1 
% from SJC  36.1  33.8  34.8  31.1  34.7  29.4  32.4 
% from OAK  32.5  28.4  30.0  24.0  8.8  21.5  7.5 
              
% with UA  32.7  37.5  35.6 20.6 27.8 28.5  36.4 
% with WN  54.1  49.1  51.1  69.3  60.1  62.3  52.7 
% with other  13.2  13.4  13.3  10.1  12.1  9.2  10.9 
              
All 
passengers 
            
% from SFO  29.3  35.7  31.4  45.9  61.1  55.4  69.0 
% from SJC  28.1  26.3  27.5  23.2  26.9  20.0  22.4 
% from OAK  42.5  38.0  41.0  30.9  12.0  24.7  8.6 
              
% with UA  31.1  35.5  32.6 19.5 28.4 36.7  47.1 
% with WN  55.9  50.8  54.2  71.4  60.0  56.2  44.1 
% with other  13.0  13.7  13.2  9.1  11.6  7.1  8.8 
* The results are based on the models estimated on the entire sample and on subsamples for business travelers 
or leisure travelers.  The reported shares are the weighted average across the 500 simulations, with weights 
equal to those of the estimation model.  For the common choices, the same shocks were used for all 5 cases.  
For SFO Southwest, additional shocks were generated for the new choices (SFO-WN).  The rationale is that 
the shocks are largely unobserved passenger characteristics. 
 
                                                 
23  For those scenarios that involve reduced air travel costs, the counterfactuals provide a lower bound for the 
favorable change in demand for SFO and SFO-based carriers (UA), as some consumers who previously chose 
not to fly may be induced to fly due to the improved choices offered at SFO.    The counterfactual involving 
Southwest transferring its operation from OAK to SFO does not provide intuitive bounds as some travelers’ 
observed choices are altered while new options are introduced.       18
Reducing access times at SFO by five minutes increases the market share of SFO 
from 29% to 36%.    The effect of reducing delays also is positive, but smaller (the SFO 
market share rises to 31%).    The more limited effect of reducing delays is as expected, as 
reducing access times by five minutes reduces the total time cost of travel by 5 minutes, 
while reducing delays reduces deviations from the schedule but does not necessarily imply 
a net reduction of (expected) travel time by 5 minutes.
24  For  business  travelers,  reducing 
access times increases the SFO market share by 20%, and reducing delays increases it by 
12%.    For leisure travelers, lower access times lead to a 24% increase, while shorter 
delays induce a rise of only 7% in SFO’s market share.    This suggests that both business 
and leisure travelers care about access time more than about delays, but business travelers 
attach a relatively higher value to delays than leisure travelers.    Reducing time costs of 
departing from SFO leads to lower market shares both at OAK and at SJC, but the loss is 
larger at OAK.    Since UA dominates SFO, lower time costs for using SFO lead to an 
increased market share for UA (for both passenger types), mainly at the expense of 
Southwest. 
Entry of Southwest at SFO has potentially large effects on its market share, 
depending on UA’s reaction.    If Southwest enters at SFO and retains its operation at OAK, 
and UA accommodates, the market share of Southwest increases from 56% to 71%.    But if 
UA matches Southwest’s prices, such duplication hardly affects Southwest’s market share.
25    
Inspection of the effects by type of traveler shows that price matching under duplication 
leads to an increase of Southwest’s business market share (from 54% to 62%), and a 
reduction of its share in the market for leisure travel (from 58% to 48%).  If  Southwest 
abandons OAK in favor of SFO, price matching by UA leads to a reduction of Southwest’s 
market share (to 48%).    The loss is large in the market for leisure travel, and small in the 
market for business travel.    These scenarios suggest that leisure passengers have a 
preference for a bundle consisting of cheap travel departing from OAK.    Business 
                                                 
24  The relative change is larger for delays than for access times, as the average access time is 25 minutes and 
the average delay is 11 minutes. 
25  None of these scenarios indicate irrational behavior on Southwest’s behalf, as we neglect any costs 
associated with duplicating or transferring operations.   19
travelers prefer SFO to OAK but leisure travelers like OAK more than SFO,
26 which 
suggests that leisure travelers have a strong preference for the better access time and/or 
lower travel delay at OAK relative to SFO.    Note, lastly, that entry of Southwest at SFO 
leads to a strong increase of SFO’s market share (from 29% to 46% or 69%, depending on 
the version).    This is mainly at OAK’s expense, but SJC loses a bit of market share as well 
(since more options now are available at the most preferred airport). 
 
5. Conclusion 
We estimate a weighted conditional logit model of airport and airline choice in the 
market for air travel from the San Francisco Bay Area to greater Los Angeles.    We extend 
the existing literature that has studied airport choice using the same data source, by 
considering additional explanatory variables and by showing how controlling for market 
and trip type can account for much of the heterogeneity in consumer preference and how 
the choice based sampling characterizing the data can alter policy inferences drawn from 
the data.    We interpret the estimation results from our model by considering marginal 
effects and counterfactual scenarios.    Changing the generalized costs of using a departure 
airport, whether in terms of access times or expected delays, strongly affects the market 
shares of departure airports, but the effects of access times are  larger.  Business  travelers 
are relatively more responsive to changes in delays.    Entry of Southwest at SFO affects the 
market share of departure airports as well as that of airlines.    The results suggest that 
leisure travelers have a preference for departing from OAK. 
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Appendix 1  Construction of the variables 
1.  ACC_T: airport access time by car 
  Find which TAZ matches to SFO, SJC, and OAK 
The MTC airline passenger survey records the travel analysis zone (TAZ) for each 
passenger who was interviewed. The MTC maintains a set of travel analysis zones for 
use in MTC planning studies. These TAZs are typically small area neighborhoods or   22
communities that serve as the smallest geographic base for travel demand model-
forecasting systems.    The zone system used in the MTC survey is the 1099 zone 
system developed in 1993. The MTC 1099 zone is equivalent to the 1990 census tract. 
The 1990 census tract information can be found in Bay area census website 
(www.bayareacensus.ca.gov). From the file which compares TAZ and census tract 
(ftp://ftp.abag.ca.gov/pub/mtc/), SFO, SJC, and OAK match “165”, “323”, and “647” 
respectively. 
  Use “Zone-to-Zone travel times and distances for auto” data to get “ACC_T” 
We find travel times depending on which time of day a passenger drives and on the 
vehicle occupancy rate. For example, if a passenger drives during peak hours and 
reports that two people were in vehicle, we use peak-hour driving time for ride 2.     
2.  FREQ: frequency of service 
Using OAG data, we first calculate the number of flights depending on the departure 
time and the day of week.    We count the number of flights within peak hours (6-9 AM 
and 3-6 PM) or off-peak hours (all remaining hours). Then we divided the number of 
flights by 6 or by 18 to get frequency per hour.   
3.  FARE 
We use Severin Borenstein’s DB1A fourth quarter 1995 average fares for direct flights 
4.  DEL_T 
The departure and arrival delays for all flights flown out of (SFO, SJC, OAK) to (BUR, 
LAX, ONT, SNA) for (August, October) of 1995 were used to calculate the monthly 
mean departure delay and the monthly mean arrival delay for each combination of 
origin and destination airport. DEL_T is the sum of average departure delay and arrival 
delay by peak and off-peak. Cf. http://www.transtats.bts.gov 
 
Appendix 2  Marginal Effects Calculation 
The average marginal effects reported in Table 2b are based on the “own 
characteristic” marginal effects of each sampled traveler’s observed choice.    The marginal 
effects are calculated in the manner described below for each sampled traveler.    The 
marginal effects are then averaged using the same weights as in estimation.    The weights   23
help extrapolate the average to the population, rather than the sample (which over-
represents travelers choosing San Jose Airport). 
For airline/airport characteristics that are continuous, the own characteristic 
marginal effect is the probability derivative, βk Pij (1- Pij), where βk is the estimated 
coefficient for characteristic k and Pij the estimated probability of traveler i choosing 
observed choice j.    For airfare, the income interaction is properly incorporated into the 
derivative calculation. 
For discrete airline/airport characteristics, the own characteristic marginal effect is 
the discrete difference in the estimated probability of the observed choice.     
For airport dummies, it is the difference in the estimated probability assuming the 
observed choice flew out of the considered airport versus the estimated probability 
assuming the observed choice flew out of the actually observed airport.    In the case where 
the actual and considered airports are the same, the actual airport is substituted with the 
excluded airport (SFO for departure airports and LAX for arrival airports).  All  other 
airport/airline characteristics are held the same as the observed choice. 
For airline dummies, it is the difference in the estimated probability assuming the 
observed choice was with the considered airline versus the estimated probability assuming 
the observed choice was with the actually observed airline.    In the case where actual and 
considered airlines are the same, the actual airport is substituted with the excluded airline 
(non-Southwest, non-United). All other airport/airline characteristics are held the same as 
the observed choice. 
   24
Appendix 3: Unweighted conditional logit estimates 
 
Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error
sjc 0.1428 0.1718 0.4281 0.2547 -0.1598 0.2534
oak -0.0106 0.1265 -0.1418 0.1952 0.0118 0.1793
wn 1.1582 0.1103 1.0094 0.1494 1.0188 0.1837
ua 0.4241 0.1140 0.4180 0.1784 0.1552 0.1680
burbank -0.3968 0.0996 -0.2276 0.1414 -0.5619 0.1477
ont -0.6469 0.1196 -0.3662 0.1666 -0.8519 0.1792
oc -0.5646 0.1265 -0.3214 0.1652 -0.8142 0.2139
fare -0.0270 0.0066 -0.0178 0.0091 -0.0396 0.0106
freq_hour 0.3339 0.0754 0.5174 0.0998 0.8781 0.2040
accetime -0.0808 0.0026 -0.0777 0.0035 -0.0815 0.0039
tdelay -0.0341 0.0088 -0.0556 0.0128 -0.0396 0.0133
incgroup2 0.0147 0.0059 0.0027 0.0078 0.0174 0.0094
incgroup3 0.0105 0.0061 0.0091 0.0077 0.0151 0.0115
earBUR 0.3161 0.1674 0.4809 0.2251 0.0936 0.2541
earLAX 0.8128 0.1424 0.7219 0.2142 0.4924 0.2052
earONT 0.9682 0.1546 0.9712 0.2212 0.9192 0.2175
earSNA 0.5037 0.1661 0.4992 0.2160 0.6248 0.2643
latBUR -0.8912 0.2639 -1.0131 0.4267 -0.7636 0.3392
latLAX -0.1040 0.1112 -0.2267 0.1661 -0.3803 0.1678
latONT -0.3658 0.1601 -0.7619 0.2275 -0.1597 0.2300





-5146.5655 -2745.2628 -2354.6147  